Financial Distress In Indonesia: Viewed From Governance Structure by Widyaningsih, Aristanti
JURNAL RISET AKUNTANSI DAN KEUANGAN, 8 (2), 2020, 205-220 
205 | Jurnal Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan Vol.8 | No.2 | 2020 
 
Financial Distress In Indonesia: Viewed From Governance Structure 
 
Aristanti Widyaningsih 
Accounting Study Program, Faculty of Economic and Business Education Universitas Pendidikan 
Indonesia, Bandung, Indonesia 
 
Abstract. This study aims to determine the effect of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, the proportion of 
independent commissioners, the size of the audit committee, the independence of the audit committee, and the number 
of audit committee meetings on financial distress. There were 51 samples from 17 state-owned companies listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2015-2017 period. The data used are secondary data with data analysis techniques 
using multiple linear regression. The results showed that managerial ownership, audit committee size, and audit 
committee independence did not affect financial distress. While Institutional ownership, the proportion of independent 
commissioners, the number of audit committee meetings, and audit committee competencies affect financial distress. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In some cases, bankruptcy is an 
analysis of financial statements' poor 
performance, but some companies are 
experiencing a decline but show excellent 
short-term performance (Kordestani et al., 
2011). According to Kordestani et al., (2011), 
there are several stages before bankruptcy 
occurs, and financial distress is the final stage 
before the company goes bankrupt. 
There are external and internal factors 
that cause financial distress. External factors 
such as macroeconomic factors have a 
significant impact on financial difficulties, one 
of which is fluctuations in inflation, interest 
rates, Gross National Products, credit 
availability, employee wage levels, 
international business competition, and so on 
(Liou, D. K. dan Smith, M., 2007). While the 
company's internal factors, according to Lizal, 
L. (2002) that causes companies to experience 
financial distress are Neoclassical models, 
Financial models, Corporate Governance 
models. 
In the 1997-1998 financial crisis in 
Asia, many studies mentioned that poor 
corporate governance is a crucial factor 
causing companies to experience financ ia l 
difficulties (Lu, Y. C. & S. L. Chang., 2009). 
With good corporate governance, the company 
will avoid financial distress. 
The structure of company ownership, 
which is one of the elements in implementing 
corporate governance, generally is manager ia l 
ownership and institutional ownership. 
Managerial ownership can control 
management in taking action or decision 
making because management has a dual role in 
addition to managing the company as well as a 
shareholder in the company, to improve 
company performance. It is also hoped that 
managerial ownership will help reduce 
conflicts of interest between management and 
shareholders. Research by Jumianti R, et al. 
(2016) and Fatonah, A. (2016) show that 
managerial ownership positively affects 
financial distress. With the purchase of shares 
by management, management will be more 
careful in acting, because management also 
acts as a shareholder of the company and has 
the same interests as the principal. 
However, research of Mayangsari, LP. 
(2015) produces different things, manager ia l 
ownership does not affect the likelihood of 
financial distress, because whatever 
percentage of ownership by managerial does 
not affect the possibility of the company 
experiencing financial pressure. Ownership by 
the directors is considered to worsen the 
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condition of the company because if the 
directors become owners of the company, 
there will be the possibility of expropriation. 
Institutional ownership is an institut ion 
both inside and outside the country that has 
shares or ownership of the company. Several 
studies have shown that institutiona l 
ownership can help companies avoid financ ia l 
distress. Because when other institutions have 
shares in a company, they will put control and 
monitor the way the company so as to 
encourage management to try to maintain the 
maximum image of the company's 
performance in the eyes of institutiona l 
shareholders (stakeholders). In line with 
research (Jumianti et al., 2016) the greater the 
institutional ownership, the more efficient use 
of company assets, so that the possibility of 
companies experiencing financial distress will 
be smaller. 
In Indonesia several state-owned 
companies that have gone public have 
substantial institutional ownership, one of 
which is PT Perusahaan Gas Negara, which is 
82% owned by a foreign entity, which is of 
concern to the public is when all profits of 
state-owned companies run into foreign 
pockets. But the government ensures that they 
will continue to control the running of the 
company, even more so with the dual color 
shares that give authority to the holders 
(government) to fully control the company. 
Bodoastuti, T. (2009) and Hanifa, OE. 
& Purwanto, A. (2018) show that institutiona l 
ownership has no significant effect on 
financial distress. The higher percentage of 
institutional ownership indicates that 
ownership of the company is only in one 
institution. Centered ownership can lead to a 
lack of transparency in the use of funds in the 
company as well as an appropriate balance 
between current interests, for example, 
between shareholders and company 
management and between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. 
A company listed on the Exchange 
must have an independent commissioner who 
does not hold company ownership and must be 
free from business interests that can influence 
his actions and act independently. The number 
of independent directors is 30% of the total 
company commissioners following the 2004 
BEJ regulations. According to Fatonah (2016), 
the higher the proportion of independent 
commissioners, the smaller the possibility of 
financial distress, because the function of the 
independent board of commissioners can help 
management overcome managerial problems 
that the company faces. Different from the 
results 
Bodroastuti (2009) states that in 
Indonesia, the role of Independent 
Commissioners is not working correctly, so 
that the proportion of independent 
commissioners does not affect the likelihood 
of financial distress. 
The audit committee is tasked with 
protecting the interests of shareholders, 
providing advice and recommendations in the 
company's financial and operational aspects. 
Following Bapepam-LK regulation no 1.5 
regarding "Establishment and Guidelines for 
the Implementation of Audit Committee 
Work" the audit members must have a 
minimum of three people, at least one 
independent commissioner who concurrently 
serves as chairman of the audit committee, and 
two other independent parties from outside the 
company, one of whom must have an 
educational background in accounting or 
finance. 
The presence of an audit committee can 
help a company avoid financial distress 
through functional corporate governance 
mechanisms. To be able to achieve the 
objectives of forming an audit committee, the 
audit committee must have proper criteria, 
namely the size of the audit committee, the 
independence of the audit committee 
members, the frequency of audit committee 
meetings, and financial experts owned by the 
audit committee (Rahmat, M.M. dan T.M. 
Iskandar, 2008). 
Fatonah (2016) states that the audit 
committee has a positive effect on financ ia l 
distress. Gunawijaya (2015) states that a 
company with a high audit committee size will 
reduce the likelihood of financial distress. 
With the audit committee at the company, the 
supervisory function on the company's 
JURNAL RISET AKUNTANSI DAN KEUANGAN, 8 (2), 2020, 205-220 
207 | Jurnal Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan Vol.8 | No.2 | 2020 
 
financial structure will be better and help 
improve the company's financial performance. 
However, it is different from Mayangsar i 
(2015) which states that the audit committee 
has a negative effect on financial distress. 
More and more members of the audit 
committee sometimes make it difficult to agree 
on decisions in carrying out their performance. 
While the audit committee with a small 
number of members, the lack of diversity of 
skills and knowledge causes ineffective. 
The existence of inconsistencies from 
the results of previous studies, this study aims 
to determine the effect of the structure of good 
corporate governance on financial distress. 
The difference between this research and 
previous research is that the researcher focuses 
on the influence of the audit committee 
criteria, which is one of the oversight functions 
of the good structure corporate governance 
towards the occurrence of financial distress in 
listed SOEs in the 2015-2017 period and 
divides it into several additional variables. 
The issues raised in this study are 
whether Managerial Ownership, Institutiona l 
Ownership, the proportion of Independent 
Commissioners, the size of the Audit 
Committee, the Independence of Audit 
Committee Members, the Frequency of Audit 
Committee Meetings, and the Competence of 
Audit Committees affect financial distress. 
 
Agency Theory  
An agency relationship is a principa l 
contract, i.e., the owner of the company or 
investor who appoints the agent as 
management to manage the company on behalf 
of the principal who delegates some authority 
to the agent related to decision making (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory can solve 
the problems that arise when there is 
incomplete information when entering into 
contracts carried out by principals and agents 
(Gudono, 2012, p.147); in this case, the 
principal is the company (shareholders or 
company leaders). The agent is the manager of 
the company (management and subordinates ). 
According to Widyantari, A.P. (2011), both 
parties will maximize their respective utilit ie s 
in the contract; therefore, the possibility that 
agents do not always act according to the 
principal's needs will always occur. 
 
Financial Distress 
Financial distress is a stage of a very 
significant decline in financial conditions as a 
stage before the company experiences 
liquidation or bankruptcy (Platt, H.D. and 
M.B. Platt, 2002). The company cannot meet 
the payment schedule or when cash flow 
predicts that soon the company will not pay its 
obligations (Brigham, E.F. and Davis, P.R., 
2003) or dividends when due (Emery, Douglas 
R., Jhon D. Finnetery dan Jhon D. Stowe., 
2004). 
Financial distress occurs when net 
profit (net profit) in a negative company, and 
has suffered losses for three consecutive 
periods (Kordestani et al., 2011). Showing low 
and minus earnings per share (EPS) in a 
number of years (Elloumi, F. and Gueyie, J., 
2001). Besides the value of assets that are the 
same as the value of debt can also reflect the 
occurrence of financial distress in a company 
(Anggraeni, D., 2015). 
Financial distress is a condition in 
which a company cannot achieve its 
objectives, due to a decline in the value of the 
company and a deterioration in the company's 
financial condition which results in the 
company being unable to fulfill its obligations, 
and allowing the company to not be able to 
operate in the future because it does not have 
adequate operating costs. 
 
Managerial Ownership and Financial 
Distress 
Managerial ownership is ownership of 
shares by company managers or company 
managers to equalize interests with other 
shareholders (Radifan, R. and ENA Yuyetta, 
2015). Managerial ownership can reduce 
agency problems in one company. Manageria l 
ownership makes management have a dual 
function, in addition to managing the company 
but also as the owner of the company 
(Christiawan, Y.J. and Tarigan, J., 2007). 
Management has the right to vote and advise at 
the GMS so that it can influence the decisions 
of the company. Therefore, managers will be 
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more careful in making decisions and acting 
because in carrying out the management of its 
functions will also consider its role as a 
shareholder which will have an impact on 
improving its performance in order to bring the 
company into a better direction so that the 
company can provide added value (value-
added) for shareholders. Manageria l 
ownership will help the company manage the 
company well to prevent problems that arise, 
such as the possibility of financial distress. 
  The research results by Fadilah, F.N. 
and Syafarudin M., (2013) and Fatonah (2016) 
say that the proportion of manager ia l 
ownership influences financial distress, when 
managerial ownership is high, the possibility 
of companies experiencing financial distress 
will be lower. Aritonang, A.P., (2013) states 
that high managerial ownership will help 
companies reduce the risk of financ ia l 
difficulties because the common interests of 
the principals and agents to minimize the 
occurrence of agency conflicts. 
 
H1: Managerial ownership affects Financia l 
Distress. 
 
Institutional Ownership and Financial 
Distress 
Aritonang, A.P., (2013) states that if 
other institutions have company ownership, 
the management cannot hide the company's 
condition or failure, which will trigger 
financial distress, so the company will try its 
best to avoid that condition. Siallagan, H. & 
Machfoedz Mas’ud (2006) said that economic 
shareholding has a tremendous incentive to 
control and monitor functions. When other 
institutions or organizations outside the 
company have company ownership, it can add 
incentive control to the company. management 
will focus on performance 
Furthermore, it lost the opportunity to 
commit fraud and would use assets as best as 
possible to maintain the company's trust and 
right image in investors' eyes. Then manager ia l 
ownership is one of the factors that influence 
company performance. So that management 
will not lose investors and capital funds for 
company needs. Helena, S. and Saifi, M., 
(2018) also found a positive influence between 
managerial ownership and financial distress. 
Institutions will force management and 
directors to work optimally in order to increase 
the company's profitability. Radifan, R. and 
ENA Yuyetta (2015) stated that the high 
percentage of institutional ownership in 
companies would be comparable to the 
company's monitoring function because other 
institutions could control management through 
the monitoring function and avoid companies 
from financial distress. Institutional ownership 
as one part of the structure of good corporate 
governance will increase management' s 
motivation to improve performance so that 
they can reach more investors and develop 
their companies and also so that they do not 
lose investors and lose capital to enable 
companies to experience financial distress 
(Fatonah, A.N.,2015). 
Nevertheless, Lee, C.I., et al (1992:61) 
revealed that institutional investors are 
temporary owners (transfer owners). They 
usually speculate on the performance of 
management. When performance decreases, 
stock prices fall, and the company's value often 
decreases, institutional investors withdraw 
their shares, and leave the company. Usually, 
institutional ownership has a sizable 
percentage in the company's capital structure. 
When institutional investors withdraw their 
shares, it will again affect the company's 
capital structure. If the smaller the percentage 
of institutional ownership, the withdrawal of 
shares by investors will not affect the 
performance of management, and the tendency 
for financial distress will decrease. 
 
H2 : Institutional ownership influences 
financial distress 
 
Independent Commissioners and Financial 
Distress 
The independent board of 
commissioners has no affiliation or particula r 
interests to the company (Situmorang, RB., 
2015) will maximize its independence in 
carrying out its duties as supervisors of the 
directors of its performance led by the director 
(Hadi, 2014). Then the higher the proportion of 
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independent commissioners in the company 
will improve the quality and performance of 
the company because of the existence of 
independent commissioners who can work 
objectively and independently without 
intervention from other parties. They do not 
have any interest in the running of the business 
in the company. They can improve company 
performance by producing excellent and 
objective recommendations and suggestions 
for the strategies the company will undertake 
so that the company will avoid financ ia l 
distress. 
 Then it can be said that its 
independence of management will affect 
supervision that occurs effectively in one 
company (Beasley M.S. & Salterio S.E., 
2001). The existence of a board of 
commissioners will create a pleasant oversight 
environment and maximum performance so 
that it will minimize the possibility of financ ia l 
difficulties (Dalton, D.R., et al., 1999). 
Aritonang, A.P. (2013) states that a 
high number of boards of commissioners will 
improve the quality of the controlling function 
objectively without favoring the directors or 
management. Independent commissioners are 
independent individuals who come from 
outside the company. Li, J., Pike, R., & 
Haniffa, R (2008) state that there is a 
significant influence on financial distress. The 
higher the proportion of independent directors, 
the possibility of financial distress will 
decrease. The independence of the 
independent commissioners will enable 
effectiveness in making decisions 
appropriately and quickly and improve the 
company's quality. With good company 
quality, all aspects of the company will work 
well, so that financial distress will not occur in 
the company (Jumianti, R. et al., 2015) 
 
H3 : The proportion of Independent 
Commissioners influences Financial Distress. 
 
Size of the Audit Committee and Financial 
Distress 
The existence of an audit committee in 
a company can provide a source of greater 
control over management and publish quality 
reports (Al-Najjar B., 2011). With the right 
number of audit committees will enable audit 
committee meetings to exchange ideas and 
information in order to produce 
recommendations or suggestions that can help 
the company to increase its value and 
performance to avoid financial distress. 
Beasley M.S. & Salterio S.E. (2001) state that 
the right size of the audit committee can enable 
them to use their own experiences and assist 
the committee in the monitoring function. 
Gunawijaya (2015) said that the 
number of audit committees could influence 
the likelihood of financial distress. The 
background and competence of each member 
of the different audit committees will enable 
them to complement each other in carrying out 
their duties. The audit committee will assist the 
board of commissioners in carrying out their 
duties to maximize the oversight function, and 
the possibility of financial distress can be 
overcome (Fatonah, 2016). Pembayun, A.G. 
and Januarti, I. (2012) succeeded in proving 
that the large size of the audit committee 
improved the quality of the company's interna l 
controls, to reduce the possibility of financ ia l 
distress. 
 
H4 : The size of the Audit Committee 
influences Financial Distress 
 
Independence of the Audit Committee and 
Financial Distress 
In its implementation, the audit 
committee must consist of at least one person 
from an independent commissioner. An 
independent commissioner can protect the 
interests of the holders share by ensuring 
management issues quality financ ia l 
statements (Sharma, V.D. & Iselin E.R, 2006). 
The existence of an independent commissioner 
who is part of the audit committee will 
contribute to providing suggestions for the 
creation of a plan company strategy that can 
affect company performance. 
`         The Audit Committee's independence 
on the occurrence of financial distress. When 
the proportion of independent directors in a 
company is minimal, the audit committee' s 
performance in conducting oversight of the 
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financial statements will be less than optimal, 
which will cause financial distress. 
Research by Defond and Francis 
(2006) shows that independence high audit 
committees can better monitor management 
and make objective decisions. Besides, 
Carcello and Neal (2000) found that there was 
a negative relationship between the 
independence of the audit committee and 
financial distress. In other words, they found 
that the higher the independent commissioners 
on the audit committee, the less likely the 
auditor would issue a report on the occurrence 
of financial distress at the company. 
 
H5 : The independence of the Audit 
Committee influences Financial Distress. 
 
Number of Audit Committee and Financial 
Distress Meetings 
 The frequency of audit committee 
meetings has an essential role in the 
effectiveness of the audit committee in 
exercising quality control (Goodwin-Stewart 
and Kent, 2006). The audit committee works 
to improve audit quality by using a better 
monitoring system. To carry out the audit 
committee's effectiveness in carrying out its 
duties and obligations, the audit committee 
needs to hold regular meetings or meetings. 
According to FCGI (2002), the audit 
committee needs to hold meetings 3 to 4 times 
a year. The frequent audit committee meetings 
conducted will affect the audit committee' s 
effectiveness in carrying out its duties in the 
form of supervision and monitoring, which 
oversees the preparation and reporting of 
financial statements (Collier and Gregory, 
1999; Rahmat et al., 2008). 
Thus the existence of these meetings 
can be maximize the performance of the audit 
committee, because the meeting will be a 
means of communication between the audit 
committee in delivering information, 
knowledge, and findings that they have in 
order to achieve the objectives of the audit 
committee which is to provide advice and 
recommendations while overseeing the 
company's running following company rules 
and regulations -invitation. 
Nuresa, A., & Hadiprajitno, B. (2013) 
research shows an influence between the 
number of audit committee meetings with 
financial distress. The number of audit 
committee meetings more often can change 
management behavior patterns. The frequency 
of frequent and structured audit committee 
meetings will continuously result in interna l 
control by the audit committee and do not 
provide a loophole for agents to make 
mistakes. The audit committee can 
immediately see and detect quickly and handle 
any agent errors so that the audit committee 
can protect the principal's interests. This 
activity can overcome agency problems and 
prevent the company from financial distress. 
Another study conducted by Zain, M. 
M., Subramaniam, N., & Stewart, J. (2006) 
found that audit committee meetings can 
increase the effectiveness of the interna l 
auditor's function, because the internal auditor 
is responsible for launching findings or 
problems to the audit committee, and then will 
discuss the overall control assessment so that 
actions taken a right can be taken. (Salloum, 
C., Azzi, G., & Gebrayel, E., 2014). 
 
H6 : The number of Audit Committee 
Meetings affects Financial Distress 
 
Competence of the Audit Committee and 
Financial Distress 
An essential factor of audit committee 
effectiveness is expertise in auditing, 
accounting, and internal control (Salloum, C., 
Azzi, G., & Gebrayel, E., 2014). The presence 
of a certified member (CPA) on the audit 
committee is negatively related to financ ia l 
distress. FCGI (2002) says that the audit 
committee must have at least one member 
whose background is in accounting or financ ia l 
education. This competency will help the audit 
committee carry out its role and function, 
namely assessing the reports made by the 
Internal Supervisory Unit (SPI) or external 
auditors, especially in the financial statements, 
and ensuring they meet existing standards and 
regulations. 
Based on the internal audit perspective, 
the presence of financial experts in the audit 
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committee will reduce errors or weaknesses of 
the internal audit (Hoitash, U., Hoitash, R., & 
Bedard, J. C., 2009). The possibility of interna l 
auditor fraud or deviation will have an impact 
on the company's financial condition. The 
audit committee needs insight, knowledge, and 
experience to find these things, so the audit 
committee's competence will be an essentia l 
feature in the implementation of an active 
oversight function so that a competent audit 
committee can minimize the occurrence 
problems with the company's financ ia l 
condition or financial distress. 
The same thing in the research of 
Nuresa, A., & Hadiprajitno, B. (2013) shows 
that the audit committee's existence as 
controlling policies related to finance. High 
audit committee competency can minimize the 
efforts of agents to manipulate financial data or 
corporate financial procedures, to avoid 
principals from the effects of agency fraud 
while overcoming agency problems that arise 
and avoid companies from occurring financ ia l 
distress. 
Rahmat, M.M., dan T.M. Iskandar. 
(2009) also stated that audit committee 
members' backgrounds in the form of 
accounting and financial education would 
reduce the possibility of financial distress in a 
company. The existence of financial experts in 
the audit committee can increase the 
effectiveness in fulfilling its responsibilit ie s 
incorporate financial supervision (Salloum, C., 
Azzi, G., & Gebrayel, E., 2014) 
 
H7 : The competence of the Audit Committee 




Population and Research Samples 
This research uses descriptive research 
design through a quantitative approach. 
Population in the research of BUMN 
companies registered in the IDX period 2015-
2017. The sampling technique uses a non-
probability sampling method with a purposive 
sampling approach. The sample comes from 
the annual report data of 19 BUMN companies 
in 2015-2017 or with three years of research, 




Financial distress as dependent variable. 
Researchers use Earning Per Share 
(EPS) as a tool to identify financial distress in 
the company. EPS can reflect the company's 
condition from various aspects, both the 
company's performance, the value of 
stakeholder dividends, and the value of 
earnings per share. In this study, EPS is 
measured by dividing net earnings / net income 
by outsanding shares / number of shares 
outstanding during the period. 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑒𝑟  𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
 𝑥 100%  
Elloumi dan Guiye (2001) 
Independen Variable 
Managerial ownership in this variable 
is measured by looking at share ownership 
owned by management. By dividing the 
percentage of management share ownership, 
namely the board of directors and the 
commissioners' board with the total number of 
shares outstanding in the company. 
Institutional ownership in this variable 
by looking at how large the number of shares 
owned by other institutions. By dividing the 
percentage of share ownership by entitie s 
outside the company or ownership of shares by 
other institutions by the company's total 
number of shares outstanding. 
Determine the proportion of 
independent directors by dividing the 
percentage of the number of independent 
directors in the company by the entire board of 
commissioners in the company. 
In this study, the Audit Committee Size 
uses the number of audit committee members 
in the company. 
We measure the audit committee' s 
independence by comparing the number of 
independent commissioners who are members 
of the audit committee with the number of 
audit committee members in a company in a 
certain period. 
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Measure the variable number of audit 
committee meetings by counting the number of 
audit committee meetings in one year 
(Gunawijaya, 2015). 
Measuring the audit committee 
competency variable by dividing the amount 
Audit committee members with accounting or 
financial education background with the 
number of audit committee members in a 
company. 
 
Technical Data Analysis 
This study uses multiple regression 
analysis techniques with the OLS method after 
fulfilling the classical assumption test. The 
regression equation formula used is: 
 
Y’ = a + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 
+ 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝛽7𝑋7 
 
Information : 
Y = Level of Financial Distress 
X1 = Managerial Ownership, measured by the 
proportion of share ownership by the 
manager 
X2 = Institutional ownership, measured by the 
proportion of share ownership by 
institutional 
X3= proportion of independent commissioners 
from the total number of boards 
X4 = The audit committee's size, measured by 
counting the number of members of the 
audit committee 
𝑋5 =Audit committee independence, 
measured by counting the number of 
independent commissioners who are 
members of the audit committee 
𝑋6 = number of audit committee meetings, 
measured by counting the number of 
audit committee meetings in one year 
X7 = Audit committee competence, measured 
by counting the number of audit 
committee members against accounting 
and financial education 
a = Y value if X = 0 (constant) 
𝛽 = regression coefficient 
Hypothesis testing using the 
significance level (α) = 0.05 or 5% with 
degrees of freedom (df) = (α / 2; n - 1 - k), and 
determine the area of acceptance or rejection 
of the hypothesis by determining the 
probability level as follows: 
a. Significance <5%, then the hypothesis is 
accepted 
b. Significance> 5%, then the hypothesis is 
rejected. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
. 
The results of multiple linear 
regression analysis on the SPSS program 
through the coefficients table, as follows: 
 
Table 1. Test Results t 
  
 From table 1, the following equation is 
obtained: 
Y= 10,665 + 0,908 X1 + 7,748X2 – 20,564X3 + 
2,957X4 + 17,663X5 + 2,087X6 – 23,552X7 
 
Effect of Managerial Ownership on 
Financial Distress 
 
The results of the Hypothesis test states 
that managerial ownership does not affect the 
level of financial distress. Statistical data 
processing results show that manager ia l 
ownership does not affect the level of financ ia l 
distress with a significance value of 0.880> 
0.05, thereby accepting Ho and rejecting Ha. 
According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), in practice, managers who play a dual 
role as the owner of the company, in managing 
the company will be more careful in acting, 
because every management action will affect 
the company's performance and the company's 
stock price. Then the company's management 
will act not only as a manager of the company 
but also as a shareholder of the company. This 
position can affect the company's financ ia l 
performance, which is the responsibility of 
management, and managerial ownership can 
minimize agency problems. 
B Std.Error Beta
1. Constant 10,665 11,079 ,963 ,341
MO ,908 5,972 ,021 ,152 ,880
IO 7,748 7,080 ,168 2,094 ,044
PIC -20,564 14,777 -,225 -2,392 ,021
ACS 2,957 4,204 ,102 ,703 ,485
ACI 17,663 12,662 ,230 3,395 ,170
NACM 2,087 ,851 ,346 2,451 ,018
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In this study, by rejecting Ha and the 
insignificance of the results of the study, it 
shows that managerial ownership does not 
affect the possibility of financial distress in a 
company, or the level of managerial ownership 
cannot prevent the company from 
experiencing financial difficulties. Not all 
companies, especially SOEs, have manager ia l 
ownership, this shows that there are still 
companies that do not provide incentive 
policies to managers through manager ia l 
ownership. Ownership by the directors may 
worsen the condition of the company because 
if the directors become owners of the 
company, there will be the possibility of 
expropriation, or an attempt to enrich or 
maximize personal utility by using their 
authority as a company policymaker. 
Bodroastuti (2009) and Mayangsar i 
(2015) stated, with the high share ownership 
by the directors, the directors have interests in 
the company's business, so that it will be easier 
for directors to reach/fulfill their utilities. The 
Board of Directors is a company manager who 
can formulate company policies, such as 
company operating policies (employee 
salaries, bonuses or compensation, and 
pension funds), sales control policies, and 
freezing out policies (selling shares to other 
parties). Directors and commissioners who 
determine these policies can abuse their 
authority to fulfill their interests as company 
owners. 
 
The Effect Of Institutional Ownership On 
Financial Distress 
The results of the Hypothesis testing 
show that institutional ownership affects the 
level of financial distress with a significance 
value of 0.044 <0.05. The results showed that 
institutional ownership size significantly 
influenced the condition of financial distress, 
thereby rejecting Ho and accepting Ha. 
Jumiati et al. (2015) states with 
ownership institutional, the utilization of 
company assets will be more efficient so that 
the possibility of companies experienc ing 
financial distress will be slighter. Aritonang 
(2015), in his research, stated that if the 
company has ownership of institutiona l 
investors, it allows the company's management 
can not hide losses or fail, and trigger financ ia l 
distress. The intervention of other institutions 
outside the company with company shares or 
institutional ownership can be possible 
improved supervision of the company. The 
company does not only work for the interests 
of parties within the company, but some 
outsiders have rights and interests. 
 However, what should be a concern is 
that too much institutional ownership is not 
suitable for the company. Institutiona l 
investors are temporary owners (transfer 
owner). They usually speculate on the 
performance performed management. When 
performance decreases, stock prices fall, and 
the company's value decreases, often 
institutional investors withdraw their shares 
and leave the company.  
Usually, institutional ownership has a 
sizable percentage in the company's capital 
structure. When institutional investors 
withdraw their shares, it will again affect the 
company's capital structure. If the smaller the 
percentage of institutional ownership, the 
withdrawal of shares by investors will not 
affect the performance of management, and the 
tendency for financial distress will decrease.  
If an institution owns too many shares, 
and there is terrible news about the company, 
there can be a sell-off by the institution, which 
will cause the stock price to plummet, 
especially if the company goes public. They 
are vulnerable to takeovers by other companies 
if the company's stock price falls substantially.  
This research is in line with the research of 
Aritonang (2013) which states that 
institutional ownershipaffect financial distress.  
 
Influence of the Proportion of Independent 
Commissioners on Financial Distress 
The statistical data processing results 
show that the proportion of independent 
directors influences the level of financ ia l 
distress with a significance value of 0.021> 
0.05. Shows that the proportion of independent 
commissioners significantly influences the 
level of financial distress, thus rejecting Ho 
and accepting Ha. 
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The independent board of 
commissioners has no affiliation or interest-
particular interests of the company 
(Situmorang, 2015). The independent board of 
commissioners will maximize their 
independence in carrying out their duties as 
supervisors of the performance of the Directors 
(Hadi, 2014). Adequate supervision of a 
company depends on its independence of 
management (Beasley M.S. & Salterio S.E., 
2001). The existence of a board of 
commissioners will create a pleasant 
supervision environment and maximum 
performance to automatically minimize the 
possibility of financial difficulties (Dalton 
D.R. Daily C.M. Johnson J.L. & Ellstrand 
A.E., 1999). 
This study's results indicate that the 
more significant the proportion of independent 
commissioners of a company on the board of 
commissioners enables being able to conduct 
tighter and objective supervision of 
management behavior and can also produce 
recommendations that will produce strategic 
plans to improve company performance. 
Thus, it can avoid financial distress to 
the company because as according to the 
General Guidelines of GCG in Indonesia, the 
independent board of commissioners has a 
supervisory and advisory board function 
covering prevention, improvement, and 
temporary dismissal. Management can run the 
company well because the independent board 
of commissioners has substantial control over 
the decisions to be taken by management at the 
company. Besides, minority shareholders 
propose and elect independent commissioners, 
not only by controlling shareholders, so that 
there will be protection for minor ity 
shareholders. The existence of independent 
management of the company in protecting 
minority shareholders/shareholders, so that 
making policies or decisions does not tend the 
majority shareholders only. This research is in 
line with Fathonah (2016) research and 
Aritonang (2013), which shows that the 
proportion of independent commissioners has 
a significant influence on finance. 
 
Effect of Audit Committee Size on Financial 
Distress 
 
Hypothesis testing results indicate that 
the size of the audit committee does not have a 
positive effect on the level of financial distress, 
with a significance value of 0.485> 0.05. Thus 
accepting Ho and rejecting Ha. The existence 
of an audit committee in a company can 
provide a source of greater control over 
management and also publish quality reports 
(Al-Najjar, 2011). Having an appropriate and 
appropriate number of audit committees will 
allow audit committee meetings to exchange 
ideas and information to produce 
recommendations or suggestions that can help 
the company to increase its value and 
performance to avoid financial distress 
(Beasley M.S. & Salterio S.E., 2001) 
Based on Bapepam Circular No. SE-3 / 
PM / 2000 and Financial Institution Number: 
Kep-643 / BL / 2012 No.2 that the number of 
audit committee members in Indonesian public 
companies consists of at least three members, 
the company's independent commissioner as 
chairman and with two independent external 
people. The existing sample shows that there 
are companies that have an audit committee 
under the provisions, and some are above the 
provisions of up to seven members. The results 
showed that the size of the audit committee 
was less able to support the effectiveness of the 
performance of the audit committee. The audit 
committee is not competent if the size is too 
small or too large. This argument is supported 
by Anggraini's (2010) research, which shows 
that audit committees with large members tend 
to lose focus and are less participatory 
compared to smaller sizes. More and more 
audit committee members sometimes make it 
difficult to agree on decisions in performing 
their performance. 
However, on the other hand, the audit 
committee, with a small number of members, 
lacked a diversity of skills and knowledge and 
thus became ineffective. This study is in line 
with Hanifah, O. E., & Purwanto, A.  (2013) 
and Radifan, R., & Yuyetta, E. N. A.  (2015) 
research that the size of the audit committee 
does not affect financial distress, which states 
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that an increasing number of audit committee 
members complicate the decision of the 
agreement in its performance. 
 
The Influence of the Audit Committee  
Independence on Financial Distress 
Hypothesis testing results show that the 
independence of the audit committee does not 
affect the level of financial distress with a 
significance value of 0.170> 0.05. A large 
proportion of independent directors can 
increase control over management (Xie, B., 
Davidson III, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J., 2003). 
That is why measuring the independence of the 
audit committee is based on the number of 
independent commissioners on the audit 
committee. The audit committee must be able 
to maintain the mandate given by the board of 
commissioners in order to provide better 
information reliability, the presence of an 
independent commissioner on the audit 
committee can help increase the capacity of the 
commissioners effectively in providing 
suggestions, controlling, and disciplining 
management (Ntim, C. G., 2013). 
Ha's refusal in this study shows that the 
independence of the audit committee does not 
affect the possibility of financial distress in a 
company. The reason underlying the research 
results is that the independence of the audit 
committee is not able to avoid the possibility 
of the company experiencing financial distress. 
The number of independent commissioners in 
state-owned companies listed on the IDX is 
still minimal, which has an impact on the 
independence of the audit committee because 
the size of the independence of the audit 
committee sees the number of independent 
commissioners who are also members of the 
audit committee. These results are consistent 
with previous research conducted by Rahmat, 
M.M., dan T.M. Iskandar (2008), which 
indicates there is no significant relationship 
between the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the audit committee on financ ia l 
distress. 
The lack of independence of the audit 
committee members resulted in the expected 
function, not working. The independence of 
the audit committee is doubtful in terms of 
providing supervision and internal control over 
the agent. The process of appointing audit 
committee members is still unclear and open, 
so the level of independence of the audit 
committee is still questionable. It is possible if 
members of the audit committee have a family 
relationship or business relationship with the 
agent. 
So that the audit committee supervis ion 
will not be optimal for the agent, this can take 
place continuously and can cause losses to the 
principal; if not immediately addressed will 
cause financial problems in the company. 
As Salim (2005) said, the formation of 
an audit committee is limited to meeting 
formal requirements. The resources of 
independent audit committee members who 
meet the qualifications are still limited. This 
study is in line with research conducted by 
Nuresha and Hadiprajitno (2013), Salloum 
(2014), and Gunawijaya (2015) that the 
independence of the audit committee does not 
influence financial distress. A large number of 
audit committee members and a large number 
of independent members on the audit 
committee cannot guarantee that the company 
will avoid financial distress. 
 
Effect of Frequency of Audit Meetings on 
Financial Distress 
Hypothesis testing results indicate that 
the number of audit committee meetings affect 
the level of financial distress with a 
significance value of 0.018 <0.05. 
Rahmat et al. (2008) stated that the 
frequent audit committee meetings would 
affect the effectiveness of the audit committee 
in carrying out their duties in the form of 
supervision and monitoring the preparation 
and reporting of financial statements. Thus the 
existence of these meetings can maximize the 
performance of the audit committee. The 
meeting will be a means of communicat ion 
between audit committees in conveying the 
information, knowledge, and findings they 
have obtained. The audit committee's purpose 
is to provide advice and recommendations 
while overseeing the company's course to 
comply with company regulations and 
legislation. 
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In this study, the more frequent 
meeting frequency can be held because the 
audit committee discusses problems or 
difficulties that arise in the company. The 
number of meetings of audit committee 
members can have a role in changing 
management behavior patterns. Demonstrat ing 
the skills performed by the audit committee in 
the process of problem-solving, as evidenced 
by frequent meetings to provide solutions and 
suggestions for solving problems faced by 
management (Gunawijaya, 2015). Audit 
committee meetings that tend to be small, even 
though they have met the regulations, are still 
less able to lead the company in a better 
direction. 
 
Effect of Audit Committee Competence on 
Financial Distress 
Many statistical test results show that 
audit committee competence harms the level of 
financial distress with a significance value of 
0.020 <0.05. Thus reject Ho and accept Ha. 
Nuresa and Adiprajipto (2013) said that the 
audit committee's existence as controlling 
policies related to finance, then with the high 
competency of the audit committee could 
minimize the agent's efforts to manipulate 
financial data or corporate financ ia l 
procedures, thus avoiding the principal of the 
impact of agency fraud as well as overcoming 
agency problems that arise and avoiding 
companies from financial distress. 
This study shows that the competence 
of the audit committee has a significant 
influence on financial distress. The accounting 
and financial education background of the 
audit committee members is beneficial for the 
company in overcoming problems related to 
the company's financial condition. People who 
understand and understand problems and have 
an adequate educational foundation will find a 
solution and overcome them. Seen from the 
perspective of an internal audit, financ ia l 
experts in the audit committee will reduce 
errors or weaknesses of the internal audit 
(Hotaish and Bedard, 2009). The audit 
committee understands very well about the 
internal audit report. Bapepam Circular No. 
SE-03 / PM / 2000 and Institutions Finance 
Number: Kep-643 / BL / 2012 states that 
companies must have at least one member 
whose background is accounting and finance. 
The results of this study are in line with 
Nuresha and Hadiprajitno (2013) states that the 
audit committee competency variable has a 
significant influence on financial distress. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusions from the results of this 
study are: 
1. Managerial ownership, the size of the audit 
committee, and the independence of the audit 
committee do not affect the condition of 
financial distress in the company. 
2. Institutional ownership, Proportion of 
independent commissioners, Number of audit 
committee meetings, and audit committee 
competencies affect the condition of financ ia l 
distress in the company. 
Suggestions or recommendations that 
can be given in this study are for the 
institutions and shareholders to pay more 
attention to the proportion of share ownership 
and also monitoring procedures in the 
company, to ensure that someday a sell-off on 
company shares will not be too influential on 
performance management. Stock sell-offs that 
can cause a fall in stock prices can occur if the 
company's performance, value and image 
deteriorate. Therefore, the company must 
ensure that it remains controlled and stable by 
implementing good corporate governance so 
that the company can avoid financial distress. 
For future researchers, to use a longer 
observation period so that it will provide a 
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